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In May 2020 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave the clarion 
call for Atmanirbhar Bharat1 or ‘Self Reliant India’; the initiative, at 
least until then referred to economic stimulus packages intended for 
the distressed population during the Pandemic. However, soon after, it 
became the buzzword for modern India, the one touted as a responsible, 
reliable regional and global power which visualises itself as a self-reliant 
and self-sufficient economy while maintaining its strategic autonomy. 
This realisation further got affirmation when the country became the 
first responder and a responsible supplier of basic medicines such as 
paracetamol and hydroxychloroquine to around 120 countries during the 
initial stages of COVID-19, thus pr viding impetus to India’s medical 
diplomacy.2 
Surprisingly, even though the initiative is extended to all the sectors 
available in the country; however, the later addition of defence component 
is most notable as it not only involves the promotion of indigenous 
defence production and manufacturing but also propels massive outreach 
to friendly countries and reliable partners.3 According to Stockholm 
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International Peace Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet 2021, even though 
India’s arms imports have decreased by 33 per cent from 2011-15 to 
2016-20, still it is the second-largest arms importer in the world after 
Saudi Arabia by importing 9.5 per cent of its arms, mainly from Russia 
(49 per cent), France (18 per cent) and Israel (13 per cent).4 To make 
matters worse, India is also the third-largest country in terms of defence 
expenditure after the US and China, with US$ 71.1 billion spending in 
the defence sector.5 
Given the changing geopolitical dynamics, not only does New Delhi 
direly needs to diversify its import partners but also needs to invest in 
the indigenisation of defence products to reduce its dependence on 
other countries. Most importantly, the inability to indigenous defence 
procurement, manufacturing and production was termed as the major 
lacuna in the long talked about but never acted upon defence reforms 
proposed under the 1990s Arun Singh Committee report on Defence 
Expenditure. 
Subsequently, both the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in 1999 
and the Group of Ministers’ report (2000) set up post-Kargil conflict, 
vouched for indigenisation. However, given the civil-military non-
relations, lack of foresight, but most importantly, bureaucratic hurdles, 
led to India shying away from taking up a crucial step towards defence 
modernisation through indigenisation.6
Thus, identified as one of the ‘core areas’, the defence sector—
like other sectors initiated under Atmanirbhar Bharat—stands on five 
pillars, namely: economy, infrastructure, systems, vibrant geography 
and demand. Taking all the pillars into account, strategic partnerships 
with the Persian Gulf economies have the ability to further India’s goal 
of indigenisation in defence manufacturing, production and export. 
To strengthen the argument, in December 2020, Minister of State for 
External Affairs, V. Murleedharan remarked that “[t]he Gulf countries 
with their surplus capital, open economies and connections with different 












regions of the world such as Africa, Central Asia and Europe are well 
placed to partner with India in its quest. This is a win-win proposition 
for both India and Gulf”.7 Even though, this proposition was primarily 
focused on extending the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative in economic 
and energy-related investments, however, it stands valid even for the 
defence sector. For, the Gulf not only provides a vibrant market for Indian 
defence equipment, arms and ammunitions at a cheaper and reasonable 
rate, but also provides an opportunity for joint ventures and investments 
in the defence field. Additionally, in return, India is also an important 
export destination or the regions mobile anti-drone systems, multi-role 
transport tankers, emerging technologies and others.8 
In August 2020, a ‘negative list of 101 defence items’ was issued 
by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which includes not only minor 
products but also warfare systems, integrated platforms, and combat 
vehicles which India pledged to stop importing in a step-wise manner 
in three to four quarters starting from December last year. All these 
101 items will either be procured domestically or produced through 
joint ventures with reliable partners. Interestingly, most of the items 
listed can be achieved through joint ventures with Gulf economies too. 
Probably, the political dispensation and the policymakers have already 
ventured into this idea as the Gulf is touted as India’s second most 
preferred outreach destination after South Asia and followed by Africa. 
Thus, evolving strategic partnerships with the Persian Gulf nations 
can be used as a leverage point to enhance India’s defence industry. 
Interestingly, the Gulf already plays a strategically crucial role in India’s 
economic development, social progress and political ascendance. With 
Atmanirbhar Bharat, it has the potential to contribute enormously to 
developing India’s defence sector. 
As established, Indo-Gulf relations have transcended over a period of 
time from India being a benign power with traditional buyer-seller kind 
of transactional interaction with the region based on ideologically driven 
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Non-aligned movement (NAM) to India being a pragmatic strategic 
partner, a more reliable, responsible and trustworthy partner.9 Thus, 
it is safe to argue that with regard to the Persian Gulf, Indian foreign 
policy has been evolving progressively and much of it is to do with New 
Delhi’s response to the evolving needs and conditions in the region, as 
also domestically. While its pre-historic relations hovered around trade, 
specifically in spices, gold and silk, with the discovery of oil in the then 
Persia in 1908 and subsequently in Gulf Arab countries, the traditional 
relations with the region were focused prim rily on securing energy. 
Subsequently, with the oil boom in the 1970s, as the economic prospects 
in the Gulf increased, it gave impetus to massive Gulf migrations from 
India, especially from Southern India.10
However, despite Gulf’s enormous contribution to India’s GDP, 
the relations continued to be transactional in nature. It was only since 
the 2000s that India started to elevate its relations with the major Gulf 
economies to strategic partnership levels. Nevertheless, there was a lull 
in the engagements for a very long time until Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s ascendance since 2014, wherein with the introduction of ‘Link 
West’ and ‘Act West’ policies, relations with Gulf economies began to 
further. Today, India has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
defence cooperation with as many as five Gulf nations, namely, Iran 
(2001), UAE (2003), Qatar (2008), Saudi Arabia (2014) and Oman 
(2016).11 However, he countries have been majorly collaborating on 
intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-
extremism measures as of now with minimum or no cooperation on 
investments in defence procurements, production, exports and imports. 
This becomes even more important as the still energy component in the 
strategic partnerships with Gulf finds precedence above all. Moreover, 
with Persian Gulf economies’ drive towards economic diversification to 
achieve Vision 2030, investment in defence production can play a major 
role. 












To do so, first and foremost, India may like to establish an exclusive 
Defence Strategic Partnership with major Gulf countries.12 This is 
important as not only it provides impetus to its defence services in these 
countries and vice versa, enhance defence exports and imports, caters to 
joint ventures in defence projects, helps in setting up defence industries 
with private players’ partnerships in the region and in India;13 but can 
also help the countries to work closely on securing the Sea Lines of 
Communications (SLOC) from any potential Chinese blockades in the 
future. 
While once the start-ups in the sector in India are picked up by big 
private industries, they can invest in joint ventures with Gulf economies; 
with regard to the 101 lists, India can successfully invest in shipbuilding 
factories specifically with Oman with which the country ha  maritime 
cooperation and is successfully working jointly in anti-piracy, marine and 
coastal security issues. Moreover, India can supply indigenous short-range 
drones such as Idea Forge drones with high to middle altitude range 
which can be utilised in situational awareness at ground levels; supply 
loitering munitions such as MIDAS used for tactical levels which the 
ground troops may use; aviation industry may be boosted by production of 
indigenous helicopters such as Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) 
and its weaponised version ALH-WSI (weapon system integration); and 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) produced single-engine, fourth-
generation, multirole light fighter aircrafts such as TEJAS. Battle and 
manoeuvre tanks such as Arjun MK1, Arjun MK2 and their variants may 
find a good market in the Gulf.14 
Remarkably, in October 2020, MoD conducted a webinar with UAE, 
wherein private industries from both countries participated and presented 
their cases on individual production capabilities. From the Indian side, 
“L&T Defence, GRSE, OFB, MKU, Bharat Forge and Ashok Leyland 
made company and product presentations on major platforms/equipment 
like Artillery Systems, Radars, Protected Vehicles, Coastal Surveillance 











IndIa’s AtmAnirbhAr bhArAt and defence Outreach
System, Akash Missile system and Ammunition etc. From the UAE side 
STREIT Group, Rockford Xellerie, EDGE, TAWAZUN and Marakeb 
Technologies presented their case”.15 Such initiatives are required with 
other major Gulf countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran 
as well. 
To further bolster its defence relations and to cater responsibly to 
the region, India must seriously work upon its expeditionary capabilities, 
form a robust evacuation policy, and strengthen its defence diplomacy, 
economic interests and alliances with all the countries in the region 
while maintaining its strategic autonomy. It is noteworthy that despite 
enormous regional clout, until now India is still not an active player in 
the region unlike the US, UK, Russia and China; at the most, it is seen as 
a responsible ‘partner’ but not an actor in the region. Post-Cold War and 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, if not entirely but too much 
extent the Indian tilt towards the US policy in the region is well noticed 
and acknowledged by all the major regional and external players. On top of 
it, concerns over China’s visible strategic footprint in the region, Pakistan 
factor and India’s own aspirations to be recognised as a regional and 
global power, must push New Delhi into considering building military 
bases in the region. This is not to participate in countries’ internal matters 
but to oversee and maximise its joint defence production, manufacturing 
and cooperation and also to build a permanent base for evacuation of 
its expatriates in times of need. In this regard, Al Duqm port offered by 
Oman to Indian Navy in 2018 for establishing a military base can be used 
efficiently by India.16
On balance, while defence outreach through Atmanirbhar Bharat 
may sound promising, it requires a concerted and diligent effort to 
succeed. Given the visible competitions especially in the Gulf Arab market 
owing to the normalisation of Israel-Arab relations, Pakistan’s defence 
outreach, US plans of withdrawal and China’s active strategic footprint; 
India must work on its deliverables. Also, as India has many times missed 












the bus on defence indigenisation and modernisation, it cannot afford 
to have a lax attitude this time. However, the Indian Army Chiefs’ 
unprecedented visit to Saudi Arabia and UAE in December 2020, and 
the frequent visits and interactions with the major countries in the Gulf 
even amidst the pandemic does indicate that India is serious in its defence 
outreach to the Gulf. Besides, MoDs conduction of webinar with Indian 
and UAE’s private industries further clarified that the region sees India 
as a potential defence partner. Thus, if nurtured properly, it cannot be 
neglected that Gulf has the potential and capability to play a major role in 
boosting India’s de ence industry. 
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